

The Absence Of Grand Strategy: The United States In The Persian Gulf, 1972â€“2005

At the height of its power, the Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome

moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE. Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome fielded large armies in a strategy of "defense-in-depth," allowing invaders to pierce Rome's borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.

"In recent years, historians and other scholars have offered useful definitions, most of which coalesce around the notion that grand strategy is an amplification of the "normal" strategic practice of deploying various means to attain specific ends. "The crux of grand strategy," writes Paul Kennedy, co-founder of the influential Grand Strategy program at Yale University, "lies...in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests." John Lewis Gaddis, the program's co-founder with Kennedy, defines grand strategy succinctly as "the alignment of potentially

unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities." Hal Brands, an alumnus of Yale's program and a contributor to this volume, observes that grand strategy is best understood as an "intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy; it is the logic that helps states navigate a complex and dangerous world." Peter Feaver, who followed Yale's model when establishing a grand strategy program at Duke University, is somewhat more specific: "Grand strategy refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest." International Relations theorist Stephen Walt is even more precise: "a state's grand strategy is its plan for making itself secure. Grand strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal. Strategy is thus a set of 'contingent predictions': if we do A, B, and C, the desired results X, Y, and Z should follow.""--

David C. Kang tells an often overlooked story about East Asia's 'comprehensive security', arguing that American policy towards Asia

should be based on economic and diplomatic initiatives rather than military strength.

Historians and political scientists re-examine the conventional wisdom of grand strategies pursued by the great powers during the interwar years.

This study is designed to contribute to the current efforts to reform the United States' foreign policy and national security capabilities. It addresses contemporary problems with specific policy and structural recommendations, but also aims to teach lessons in diplomacy and strategy that apply to all times and places. The author asserts that the U.S. needs a successful long-term national strategy integrating all the instruments of statecraft to influence the world positively to restore its ability to win friends, allies, politically motivated intelligence sources, and the resultant ability to achieve peace and security.

This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four

approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage. The field of grand strategy is exceptionally American-centric theoretically, methodologically and empirically. Indeed, many scholars treat the United States as a unique case, and thus incomparable. This Element addresses the shortcomings of this approach by developing a novel framework for the purpose of systematic comparison, both within and among different countries. Using the United States as a benchmark, three dimensions are considered in which grand strategy can be compared: first, attributes of the major types commonly discussed in the literature; second, similarities and differences in the implementation of grand strategies over time, using US strategic relations with contemporary Russia as an example; and finally, across

space, properties of the grand strategies that are interactively employed by other major powers in relation to the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The Element can be used by scholars and students alike to expand analysis beyond the confines that currently dominate the field.

Søgeord: Akyab; Assam; General Ambrosio; General Anderson; Battle of the Atlantic; Assam; Marskal Badoglio; Castellano; Admiral Darlan; Dill, John; General Giraud; Admiral King; Wingate; Murphy, R.; Portal, C.; Tedder, A.; Battle of th Atlantic; Bengal; Operation Boleo; British Chiefs of Staff; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Joint Planning Sub-Committee; Longe-Range-Penetration Groups; Kampene om Rom; U-bådskrigsførelse; Unconditional Surrender; British War Cabinet; Trident; Second Washington Conference;

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[The End of Grand Strategy](#)

[The Dilemmas of Primacy and Decline from the Founding to Trump](#)

[Considerations For An American Grand Strategy \(Part 2\), \[H.A.S.C. No. 110-176\], September 24, 2008, 110-2, *](#)

[The Shaping of Grand Strategy](#)

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This book accounts the Reagan administration s development and execution of the grand strategy that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasizing the coordinated use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. It challenges the dominant narrative that often denies the existence of the grand strategy."

The Absence of Grand StrategyThe United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005JHU Press

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China's grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

In *The End of Grand Strategy*, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a

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spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America's military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors—the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. *The End of Grand Strategy* is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.

Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy thus offers both scholars and practitioners of foreign policy an original theoretical framework to explain strategic success.

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Within a variety of historical contexts, *The Shaping of Grand Strategy* addresses the most important tasks states have confronted: namely, how to protect their citizens against the short-range as well as long-range dangers their polities confront in the present and may confront in the future. To be successful, grand strategy demands that governments and leaders chart a course that involves more than simply reacting to immediate events. Above all, it demands they adapt to sudden and major changes in the international environment, which more often than not involves the outbreak of great conflicts but at times demands recognition of major economic, political, or diplomatic changes. This collection of essays explores the successes as well as failures of great states attempting to create grand strategies that work and aims at achieving an understanding of some of the extraordinary difficulties involved in casting, evolving and adapting grand strategy to the realities of the world.

foreign policy are rippling across the globe, *The Absence of Grand Strategy* offers key insight into the nature and evolution of American foreign policy in the Gulf.

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[Securing a Path Through a Complex Future](#)

[Rethinking American Grand Strategy](#)

[A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century](#)

Great Powers, Grand Strategies offers the analysis of a dozen experts on the "big picture" approaches to the South China Sea dispute. By exploring the international dimensions of this regional hotspot, Gordon Chang, Bernard Cole, James Fanell, Bill Hayton, and others examine how the military, diplomatic, and economic strategies of the major global actors have both contributed to solutions and exacerbated the potential

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for conflict. As editor of this volume, Anders Corr seeks to juxtapose the grand strategies of the great powers to determine the likely outcomes of the South China Sea dispute, as well as evaluate the ways to possibly defuse tensions in the region. "Ionut Popescu explores how successful American grand strategy comes about. For most experts in the academic world of political science and in the Washington policymaking community, the answer lies in the design and implementation of a farsighted strategic plan or framework. The role of such a Grand Design is to guide the president's foreign policy actions and resource allocation decisions in the pursuit of specific long-term objectives. The alternative to following a Grand Design is usually said to consist of ad-hoc, incoherent, and ultimately unsuccessful foreign policy decision-making. But what if successful grand strategies are sometimes formed through an emergent process of learning and adaptation, instead of being the product of strategic planning and farsighted designs? Popescu argues that the Emergent Strategy model, adapted from the business strategy literature, explains some of the traditional success stories and failures of American grand strategy better than the prevalent Grand Design model. These findings suggest the need to shift the focus of policymakers away from planning for long-term objectives and toward short- and medium-term incremental learning and adaptation. Based on this new theoretical understanding of successful grand strategy being formed by either Design or Emergent elements depending on the circumstances, the book also offers a framework to help policymakers and strategic

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planners choose the right model and tools based on the level of uncertainty they face in the external environment"--

China's continuing rapid economic growth and expanding involvement in global affairs pose major implications for the power structure of the international system. To more accurately and fully assess the significance of China's emergence for the United States and the global community, it is necessary to gain a more complete understanding of Chinese security thought and behavior. This study addresses such questions as: What are China's most fundamental national security objectives? How has the Chinese state employed force and diplomacy in the pursuit of these objectives over the centuries? What security strategy does China pursue today and how will it evolve in the future? The study asserts that Chinese history, the behavior of earlier rising powers, and the basic structure and logic of international power relations all suggest that, although a strong China will likely become more assertive globally, this possibility is unlikely to emerge before 2015-2020 at the earliest. To handle this situation, the study argues that the United States should adopt a policy of realistic engagement with China that combines efforts to pursue cooperation whenever possible; to prevent, if necessary, the acquisition by China of capabilities that would threaten America's core national security interests; and to remain prepared to cope with the consequences of a more assertive China.

This book delineates the role that Pakistan should play in the largely anarchic world of

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the twenty-first century in order to best serve the country's long-term national interests. Its main aim is to lay down the parameters within which Pakistan's grand strategy should be formulated, taking into account the evolving global and regional security environment and Pakistan's historical experience. Provided here is an in-depth analysis and critical evaluation of the past record of Pakistan's foreign policy within this context, bringing out its successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses. Based on these analyses, a comprehensive approach is recommended for safeguarding Pakistan's national security and promoting its prosperity utilizing a strategy that is a marked departure from the military-dominated, uni-dimensional policies the country has followed thus far. Besides providing guidelines to Pakistan's policy makers and intelligentsia, this book will be of interest to academics, foreign observers, and general readers in understanding the constraints and parameters within which Pakistan – a de facto nuclear-weapon state of 190 million people at the cross-roads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf – must operate to safeguard its national interests in the turbulent times ahead.

All efforts presently underway in the United States Government (USG) to plan, organize, and resource for future stabilization and reconstruction operations are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy. The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the USG, several more intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and

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allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states in order to rebuild those states' institutions of civil governance. All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with - and links together - the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results. Not only should the USG plans be linked, but also the participation with the USG in these and similar operations of allies & partners and intergovernmental & nongovernmental organizations needs to be addressed with sufficient specificity to guide investment in U.S. capacity as a measurable subset of global capacity. Absent grand strategy, which presumably accomplishes the above and more, planning and resourcing for stabilization and reconstruction operations amounts to pre-planning responses to anticipated crises on a case-by-case basis.

John Lewis Gaddis, the distinguished historian and acclaimed author of The Cold War, has for almost two decades co-taught the grand strategy seminar at Yale University with his colleagues Charles Hill and Paul Kennedy. Now, in On Grand Strategy, Gaddis reflects with insight and wit on what he has learned. In chapters extending from the

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ancient world through World War II, Gaddis assesses grand strategic theory and practice in Herodotus, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Octavian/Augustus, Saint Augustine, Machiavelli, Elizabeth I, Philip II, the American Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, Tolstoy, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Isaiah Berlin.

War--or the threat of war--usually strengthens states as governments tax, draft soldiers, exert control over industrial production, and dampen internal dissent in order to build military might. The United States, however, was founded on the suspicion of state power, a suspicion that continued to gird its institutional architecture and inform the sentiments of many of its politicians and citizens through the twentieth century. In this comprehensive rethinking of postwar political history, Aaron Friedberg convincingly argues that such anti-statist inclinations prevented Cold War anxieties from transforming the United States into the garrison state it might have become in their absence. Drawing on an array of primary and secondary sources, including newly available archival materials, Friedberg concludes that the "weakness" of the American state served as a profound source of national strength that allowed the United States to outperform and outlast its supremely centralized and statist rival: the Soviet Union. Friedberg's analysis of the U. S. government's approach to taxation, conscription, industrial planning, scientific research and development, and armaments manufacturing reveals that the American state did expand during the early Cold War period. But domestic constraints on its expansion--including those stemming from mean self-

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interest as well as those guided by a principled belief in the virtues of limiting federal power--protected economic vitality, technological superiority, and public support for Cold War activities. The strategic synthesis that emerged by the early 1960s was functional as well as stable, enabling the United States to deter, contain, and ultimately outlive the Soviet Union precisely because the American state did not limit unduly the political, personal, and economic freedom of its citizens. Political scientists, historians, and general readers interested in Cold War history will value this thoroughly researched volume. Friedberg's insightful scholarship will also inspire future policy by contributing to our understanding of how liberal democracy's inherent qualities nurture its survival and spread.

This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and

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policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis.

[The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire](#)

[The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005](#)

[What Good Is Grand Strategy?](#)

[The Absence of Grand Strategy](#)

[The Grand Strategy That Won the Cold War](#)

[Toward a New Grand Strategy](#)

[History, Theory, Cases](#)

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[Grand Strategy and Military Alliances](#)

[How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy](#)

[Comparative Grand Strategy](#)

As India prepares to take its place in shaping the course of an 'Asian century', there are increasing debates about its 'grand strategy' and its role in a future world order. This timely and topical book presents a range of historical and contemporary interpretations and case studies on the theme. Drawing upon rich and diverse narratives that have informed India's strategic discourse, security and foreign policy, it charts a new agenda for strategic thinking on postcolonial India from a non-Western perspective.

Comprehensive and insightful, the work will prove indispensable to those in defence and strategic studies, foreign policy, political science, and modern Indian history. It will also interest policy-makers, think-tanks and diplomats.

In this book, the distinguished writer Edward Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we

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know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is. Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of

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George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

The United States today is the most powerful nation in the world, perhaps even stronger than Rome was during its heyday. It is likely to remain the world's preeminent power for at least several decades to come. What behavior is appropriate for such a powerful state? To answer this question, Robert J. Art concentrates on "grand strategy"—the deployment of military power in both peace and war to support foreign policy goals. He first defines America's contemporary national interests and the specific

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threats they face, then identifies seven grand strategies that the United States might contemplate, examining each in relation to America's interests. The seven are:

- dominion-forcibly trying to remake the world in America's own image;
- global collective security-attempting to keep the peace everywhere;
- regional collective security-confining peacekeeping efforts to Europe;
- cooperative security-seeking to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting other states' offensive capabilities;
- isolationism-withdrawing from all military involvement beyond U.S. borders;
- containment-holding the line against aggressor states; and
- selective engagement-choosing to prevent or to become involved only in those conflicts that pose a threat to the country's long-term interests.

Art makes a strong case for selective engagement as the most desirable strategy for contemporary America. It is the one that seeks to forestall dangers, not simply react to them; that is politically viable, at home and abroad; and that protects all U.S. interests, both essential and desirable. Art concludes that

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"selective engagement is not a strategy for all times, but it is the best grand strategy for these times."

Based upon work supported by the Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration) under Award Number DE-FG52-03SF22724.

This book explains the grand strategic behavior of the United States from the Founding of the Republic to the Trump administration. To do so, it employs a neoclassical realist framework to argue that, while systemic change explains the broad evolution of US grand strategy, the precise shape and content of the grand strategies pursued has been conditioned by domestic political culture and interests. The book argues that distinct political cultures of statecraft (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian) have acted as permissive filters through which policy-makers have interpreted and responded to systemic stimuli, making some grand strategy choices more likely than others in the pursuit of national security. In particular, this book demonstrates that the American

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pursuit of primacy was facilitated by the predominance from the mid-19th century onward of the extroverted and vindicationist Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of statecraft, which reached a peak of influence at the end of the Cold War. The grand strategic overreach of the George W. Bush administration, however, stimulated the resurgence of the long dormant, introverted, and exemplarist Jeffersonian and Jacksonian forms of statecraft under the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively resulting in grand strategies of decline management and decline "denial." Ultimately, the return of exemplarist sentiment suggests a breakdown in elite consensus about the nature and purpose of American power in the 21st century. Michael Clarke is Associate Professor at the National Security College of the Crawford School of Public Policy at Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. This unique book examines grand strategy and the assistance such a strategy makes to the development and articulation of the National Security Strategy. This is the focus of

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much of the curriculum at all the war colleges within the Pentagon. What is the country's grand strategy? Do we need one? If one does not exist, then in a world of complexity and globalization, what is the context that we will use to make decisions in the absence of a grand strategy that guides? How can the Nation plan in a proactive sense to be ready for the future, let alone shape one, without such a framework? The papers presented at this conference represent a sampling of the diversity of opinions on this topic. We hope that it will give the reader some issues to consider. Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - Grand Strategy * Chapter 3 - Educating Strategists: Some Discomforting Contradictions * Chapter 4 - Eight Myths about American Grand Strategy * Chapter 5 - Department of Homeland Security Approach to Strategy * Chapter 6 - Forging Grand Strategy: The President's Role * Chapter 7 - Grand Strategy and Human Thinking * Chapter 8 - Designing the U.S. President's Ability to Make Strategy * Chapter 9 - The Need for Grand Strategy Development: Lessons from the

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Project on National Security Reform and Singapore * Chapter 10 - Postscript For more than 2 decades, it has been evident to many that the United States needs a new framework for a grand strategy, especially since the "containment" strategy of George F. Kennan that shaped U.S. policy during the Cold War is no longer relevant. But, what kind of framework do we need? Most commonly, grand strategy is framed in the context of warfare, or at least conflict among nations. There have been exceptions, and the focus of this symposium was not on warfare or preparation for war. Our intent was to promote a discussion about the elements of and prospect for a grand strategy for America. Over the millennia, grand strategies have evolved as the complexities of the known world grew. Rulers have created and executed grand strategies for their nations through modern times. It is possible that a 21st century grand strategy will be very different than past models since our understanding of the world has and will change our understanding of how complex systems, including nations,

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behave. The empowerment of individuals or small groups with new technologies and communication tools can extend beyond anything imagined outside the realm of science fiction. Other factors may come into play as well. Some would also argue that, in a democracy, it is not possible to attain the necessary consensus to craft and implement a national grand strategy in the absence of an existential threat. Recent political discourse lends some credence to that line of reasoning.

On November 8-9, 2011, the National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC, held a conference entitled "Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future," which I had the privilege of chairing. For more than 2 decades, I have been studying the mechanisms and methods we use as a nation to develop and conduct grand strategy. The conversation that began at that conference needs to be further developed and continued. More importantly, we, as a nation, need to explore together the path ahead and answer questions regarding how and why we

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struggle with grand strategies. If developed and executed with a systemic orientation, grand strategies could help us shape our future in an ever changing and complex world. This volume represents a compilation of some of the presentations given at the NDU conference. It also represents the great diversity of opinions regarding this subject. For more than 2 decades, it has been evident to many that the United States needs a new framework for a grand strategy, especially since the "containment" strategy of George F. Kennan that shaped U.S. policy during the Cold War is no longer relevant. But, what kind of framework do we need? Most commonly, grand strategy is framed in the context of warfare, or at least conflict among nations. There have been exceptions, and the focus of this symposium was not on warfare or preparation for war. Our intent was to promote a discussion about the elements of and prospect for a grand strategy for America. Over the millennia, grand strategies have evolved as the complexities of the known world grew. Rulers have created and executed grand

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[Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice](#)

[On Grand Strategy](#)

[Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy](#)

[American Pendulum](#)

[A Framework and Cases](#)

[Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy](#)

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[The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy](#)

[Making America Grand Again](#)

[The New Game in the South China Sea](#)

[Architecture of Triumph](#)

[Avoiding Trivia](#)

[Air University Review](#)

[The Great Powers and the Broken Balance Between the World Wars](#)

As new presidential administrations come into power, they each bring their own approach to foreign policy. No grand strategy, however, is going to be completely novel. New administrations never start with a blank slate, so it is always possible to see similarities between an administration and its predecessors. Conversely, since each administration faces novel problems and operates in a unique context, no foreign policy strategy is going to be an exact replica of its predecessors. In American Pendulum, Christopher Hemmer examines America's grand strategic choices between 1914 and 2014 using four recurring debates in American foreign policy as lenses. First, how should the United States balance the trade-offs between

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working alone versus working with other states and international organizations? Second, what is the proper place of American values in foreign policy? Third, where does the strategic perimeter of the United States lie? And fourth, is time on the side of the United States or of its enemies? Offering new readings of debates within the Wilson, Truman, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations, Hemmer asserts that heated debates, disagreements, and even confusions over U.S. grand strategy are not only normal but also beneficial. He challenges the claim that uncertainties or inconsistencies about the nation's role in the world or approach to security issues betray strategic confusion or the absence of a grand strategy. American foreign policy, he states, is most in danger not when debates are at their most pointed but when the weight of opinion crushes dissent. As the United States looks ahead to an increasingly multipolar world with increasing complicated security issues, Hemmer concludes, developing an effective grand strategy requires ongoing contestation and compromises between competing visions and policies.

This book examines the role and importance of the Presidency in the formulation and conduct of US grand strategy. The text discusses US

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strategic history, with particular emphasis on the period from the end of the Cold War to the present day. While the United States periodically has enjoyed exceptional presidential leadership in the past, this book argues that few future presidents will meet high standards of leadership in foreign affairs. In turn, this will undermine the ability of the United States to construct and maintain a coherent grand strategy appropriate to the multipolar world of the twenty-first century. Grand Strategy and the Presidency explores the role that the holders of the presidential office have played in the past development of the United States as a great power. Drawing upon examples from history, the textual analysis is shaped around the description of the long-term strategic development of the United States. The author then considers what the events of recent decades portend for the future of US strategy and foreign policy. This book will be of interest to students of Presidential Studies, US foreign policy, Strategic Studies, and IR/Security Studies in general. A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies. After World War II, George Kennan became the State Department's first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George

Marshall's initial advice to Kennan: above all, "avoid trivia." Concentrate on the forest, not the trees, and don't lost sight of the big picture. Easier said than done. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy. Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of America's foreign policymaking. Thousands of troops are engaged in combat while homeland security concerns remain. In such an environment, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance. But history tells us that such cohesiveness and coherence are tremendously difficult to establish, much less maintain. Can policy planners—in the Pentagon, the State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence Council—rise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st century foreign policy? These crucial questions guide this eye-opening book. The contributors include key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planning—individuals responsible for imposing some sort of order and strategic priority on foreign policy in a world that changes by the minute. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent

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way, for the long term. Contributors: Andrew P. N. Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron L. Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard N. Haass, William Inboden, Bruce W. Jentleson, Steven D. Krasner, Jeffrey W. Legro, Daniel Twining, Thomas Wright, Amy B. Zegart.

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